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Wait or Buy? The Strategic Consumer: Pricing and Profit Implications 
CK Anderson and JG Wilson 
Richard Ivey School of Business, Ontario, Canada 
Using tools from operations research, airlines have, for many years, taken a strategic 
approach to pricing the seats available on a particular flight based on demand forecasts and 
information. The result of this approach is that the same seat on the same flight is often offered 
at different fares at different times. Setting of these prices using yield-management approaches 
is a major activity for many airlines and is well studied in the literature. However, consumers are 
becoming increasingly aware of the existence of pricing strategies used by airlines. In addition, 
the availability of airline travel pricing on the Internet affords consumers the opportunity to 
behave more strategically when making purchase decisions. The onset of the information age 
makes it possible for an informed consumer or a third party, such as a travel agent, to obtain 
demand information similar to that used by the airlines. In particular, it is possible for consumers 
or travel agents to purchase historical data or to obtain it by monitoring the seats that are 
available at various prices for a given flight. If a consumer understands the pricing strategy and 
has access to demand information, he/she may decide to defer purchase of a ticket because they 
believe that a cheaper seat may yet become available. If consumers were to make use of this 
information to make such strategic purchasing decisions, what would be the impact on airline 
revenues? The purpose of this paper is to investigate these impacts. This work indicates that use 
of standard yield management approaches to pricing by airlines can result in significantly 
reduced revenues when buyers are using an informed and strategic approach to purchasing. 
Therefore, when airlines are setting or presenting prices, they should investigate the effect of 
strategic purchasing on their decisions. 
Introduction 
Airlines have been among the first to exploit the opportunities presented by the digital 
economy. Each year an ever-increasing fraction of their tickets are sold over the Internet. Revenues 
from Internet bookings totaled $276 million in 1996, tripled to $827 in 1997, topped $3.3 billion in 
1999.1 Recent surveys have online airline tickets sales at $16 billion in 2001—forecast to reach $40 
billion by 2007.2 Airline information systems instantaneously record ticket sales and correspondingly 
reduce the number of available seats on a given flight. Instantaneous availability of purchase data is one 
of the major competitive advantages of the new economy. 
Airlines have been very successful at using dynamic pricing and revenue management to 
increase their profitability. Revenue management is the ‘practice of controlling the availability and/or 
pricing of travel seats across different booking classes with the goal of maximizing expected revenues or 
profit’.3 In the airline industry, revenue management focuses on selling the right seat to the right 
customer at the right time for the right price. The result is that fares on a flight can differ dramatically. 
Segmentation of customers is achieved, for instance, by restrictions on refunds, requiring a Saturday 
night stay or advance purchase. Even a small percentage increase in revenue per flight can have 
important effects on an airline’s profitability. In fact, American Airlines attributes over $500 million in 
additional annual revenues to its revenue management activities.4 The impact of revenue management 
is enforced by a McKinsey & Co. study analyzing Compustat data for 1000 companies, indicating that 
price has the most dramatic impact on profits (versus costs or volumes) as a 1% increase in price 
(revenues) generates a 7.4% increase in profits.5 Revenue management is one of the great success 
stories of Operations Research techniques applied to current management issues. 
It is not unusual for an airline to open a flight for bookings up to a year in advance. The selective 
availability off are classes and the management of that availability are what constitute revenue 
management. Figure 1 indicates a typical price profile of the lowest available fare from opening to 
departure. Fares start at a moderately high level (segmented towards those risk-averse travelers who 
book extremely early), decrease in time (targeted towards the selective leisure segment) and finally 
dramatically increase for sale to less price sensitive business clients, sometimes with the possibility of 
last minute discounted (standby) fares. 
 
Revenue management is not limited to the airlines. Its principles are suitable for numerous retail 
and service industries, including advertising, entertainment, car rental, cruise ships and flexible 
manufacturing facilities.6 Coulter7 presents extensions of revenue management into managing retail 
inventories for holiday shopping. 
Generally speaking, revenue management is suitable for any business which has some degree of 
fixed capacity, an ability to segment customers for a perishable product and/or service with relatively 
low variable costs and fluctuating, but monitored, demand.8 Subrahmanyan9 discusses how these 
principles can be applied to pricing in general, indicating how quantitative approaches such as revenue 
management can be used in retail pricing decisions. The pricing profile of Figure 1 is common to 
situations of price buildup (typical of situations where demand increases with time, or less price 
sensitive customers purchase later versus sooner), but the principles may also be applied to situations of 
price drawdown (such as fashion retailing), where the retailer’s decision is when to discount (and by 
how much) versus curb discounting. 
There are a number of papers that look at intertemporal price discrimination. Stokey10 and 
Landsberger and Meilijson11 assume that consumers differ in their reservation prices for a commodity 
and consider the effect this can have on monopolistic pricing. Besanko and Winston12 provide a game-
theoretic analysis where consumer reservation prices are distributed uniformly on an interval and a 
monopolist must set a price in each of a number of periods. Lazear13 looked at strategic buyer behavior 
in retail settings, concluding that customers may wait for lower prices unless they perceive there is a 
large demand for the item, potentially losing out to other customers. Elmaghraby et al14 examine the 
potential impact of the Internet on pricing policies and indicate the advantage of a more active price 
markdown mechanism. They indicate that while most research assumes a customer will make a 
purchase immediately if the price is below the customer’s perceived value of the good or service, in fact 
he might wait for the next price markdown instead of purchasing at the current price. Gallego and van 
Ryzin15 consider optimal dynamic pricing of goods when demand is a price sensitive stochastic point 
process but consumers do not act strategically. 
We focus on the airline industry in an effort to illustrate opportunity for strategic consumer 
purchase behavior and highlight the benefits to the consumer by indicating the possible losses to the 
airline. The conclusions we draw, while focused on airlines, are extendable to other business areas as 
more information becomes available via the Internet or other sources and consumers or agents become 
more knowledgeable. 
We start with a brief description and illustration of the most commonly used revenue 
management approach. We then show how to calculate the probability that a closed fare class may 
reopen in the future. This probability is the key to strategic behavior on the part of the customer. If it is 
sufficiently high, the customer will delay purchasing a ticket in the hope that a cheaper fare will become 
available. The impact on airline revenues of such strategic behavior is investigated via extensive 
simulations for various scenarios and levels of risk aversion. 
Strategic Pricing Decisions 
The marketplace typically dictates fare offerings in the airline industry. Airlines seek to maximize 
revenue by allocating plane capacity to the various fare classes. Littlewood16 considered the case of two 
fares—full and discounted. The approach is to reserve capacity (seats) for the full fare class (ie set a 
‘protection level’ for the full fare class) equal to the (1-r/R) fractile of the demand distribution for full 
fares, where r represents the revenue from a discount fare and R the revenue from a full fare. This 
approach is similar in many ways to that of the standard ‘Newsperson problem’ from the operations 
research literature. One intuitive rationale behind this is as follows: seats should be added to those 
reserved for full fare customers until the expected marginal seat revenue from such an allocation no 
longer exceeds the revenue from a discount customer. So choose the protection level for full fares to be 
the largest integer n that satisfies 
 
where D is the demand for full fare seats. 
Note that one issue for the airlines in determining the demand (D) distributions is that recording 
of demand data usually stops when a booking limit is reached. As new ways of recording information 
become available through such channels as the Internet, this should become less of an issue. However, 
to date, it poses interesting statistical challenges. 
Belobaba17 extended this approach to multiple fare classes. The approach is as follows: work out 
a protection level for the highest fare class from the second highest class as above; then amalgamate 
the two highest fare class into one class, setting a protection level (as above) between the amalgamated 
class and the next highest; continue sequentially with this approach until one has obtained (nested) 
protection levels for all fare classes above the least expensive. This approach is illustrated below with a 
three-fare example. 
Example 1: Calculating Static Protection Levels 
Suppose there are three fares (full, saver and supersaver) with revenues of$300, $200 and $100, 
respectively. Assume historic demand for full fares is normally distributed with a mean of 15 and a 
standard deviation of5 while saver fares are normal with a mean of 25 and a standard deviation of 10. 
Then the protection level for full fares is the (1-200/300) fractile of the demand distribution for full 
fares, that is, 12.85. In order to calculate the protection level for the saver fare class, amalgamate full 
and saver into one class. The demand distribution for this amalgamated class is a normal random 
variable with a mean of15 +25 and a variance of 25+100. The average fare in this amalgamated class is 
the demand weighted average of the $300 and $200 fare classes, that is, 
 
So the protection level for this amalgamated class is the (1-100/238) fractile of a normal distribution 
with a mean of 40 and variance 125, that is, 42.23. So 12 seats would be reserved for full fares and 42 
seats should be reserved for full and saver fares combined. 
The above method of allocating seats to fare classes is static. However, Belobaba also suggests 
applying this in a dynamic fashion. For a given number of periods before departure of a flight, an airline 
will have demand information for each fare class. When the flight opens for booking, a set of protection 
levels is obtained using historical demand distributions from that point to departure. One period later, 
the airline recomputes the protection levels taking into account how many seats have been sold and the 
demand patterns from this new point onwards. This is called the ‘expected marginal seat revenue’ or 
EMSR approach. 
A periodic-review approach is generally adopted. ‘No revenue management system attempts 
full assessment of each booking request in real time’. Airlines continuously collect data on customer 
reservations. Given the volumes of data, they aggregate this data into similar periods, typically 16 or 18 
periods. The periods are longer when the flight first opens for bookings and decrease (to less than a day) 
as the flight approaches departure. This aggregated data can then be used in a more dynamic fashion to 
improve seat allocations. 
Considerable effort has been placed upon deriving and testing both Littlewood’s rule and its 
extensions. Bhatia and Parekh18 and Richter19 provide derivations for Littlewood’s model. Titze and 
Greisshaber20 provided simulation results, testing Littlewood’s model by simulating realistic passenger 
behaviors for a four-period model. Similar simulation results can be found in Mayer,21 where he 
indicated that larger losses and expected revenue results as the ratio of low-to-high fare decreases and 
when controls deny too many low-fare customers. Pfeifer22 extends the model to consider the possibility 
that the next customer may purchase a full fare ticket if a discount seat is unavailable. Leg-based 
approaches to seat allocation (like EMSR), which ignore the impacts of revenue from connecting 
passengers, continue to form the basis of most revenue management systems today.23 
Example 2: Extending to Dynamic Protection Levels 
We will now consider an extension to the static approach illustrated in Example 1. This example 
is based on the same basic assumptions as the previous example. Suppose there are three periods 
before the flight departs, and the airline models the demand for each period as a normal random 
variable with means and standard deviations as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Applying the dynamic version 
of EMSR, protection levels are set at the beginning of each period. These are shown in Table 3. 
At the beginning of period 1 (three periods before the flight departs) 12 seats are set aside for 
full fare and 42 are set aside for full and saver fares combined. Thus, for a 50- seat plane, eight seats 
may be sold at the supersaver fare. Often airlines will allow some level of overselling to compensate for 
the fact that not all customers with tickets show up at departure. For example, in the presence of 
overbooking, the airline may take 55 reservations for the 50 seat plane—under these circumstances up 
to 13 seats may be allowed for sale to the supersaver fare. At the beginning of period 2 (two periods 
before the flight departs) new protection levels are calculated. If there are enough seats left, 12 are now 
reserved for full fare and 29 are reserved for full and discount fares. Suppose, for instance, this is a 50- 
seat plane and 25 seats were sold during the first period, then 12 of the remaining seats will be reserved 
for full fare customers and the remaining seats for saver customers. Since there are only 25 seats left 
and the protection level for full and saver combined is 29, no supersaver fares will be offered during this 
period. 
The previous examples illustrate the main approach used by airlines for strategic pricing. As 
consumers become more aware of the pricing strategies for airline seats, they can also become more 
strategic in their purchasing behavior.  
 Strategic Consumer Behavior 
Consumer knowledge of the seat allocation process, combined with the reduction in cost/time 
of determining fare offerings, has created new opportunities for airline consumers. If the consumer has 
awareness of the price–time curve for an airline seat, as shown in Figure 1, and has the ability to 
determine where current fare options are located along this curve then the consumer might engage in 
strategic purchasing behavior. 
An individual customer interested in buying only one ticket will not go through the calculations 
for finding the probability that a fare class will reopen. However, the ubiquitous nature and 
comprehensiveness of the material on the Internet can make such calculations no more difficult than 
accessing a website and entering basic information. A basic theme of this paper is that airlines and other 
users of revenue management techniques must be ready for the impact this can have on their revenues. 
The Probability that a Fare Class Will Reopen 
The key to strategic consumer behavior is the consumer’s belief that a cheaper fare class will 
open if it is not currently available. In this section, we illustrate how to calculate the probability that a 
fare class will reopen, given that it is now closed. In order to keep the notation to a minimum we again 
assume, without loss of generality, that there are only three fares (full, saver and supersaver) and will 
demonstrate how to calculate the probability that supersavers will become available at some period in 
the future if this class of fare has just been closed. 
Let Fi and Si denote the random variables for demand during period i for full and saver fares, 
respectively. Let fi and si denote the protection levels for full fares and the combination of full fares and 
saver fares, respectively, during period i. 
Suppose a customer, just prior to the beginning of period k, discovers that there are no 
supersavers available and that the current capacity (ie number of seats on the airplane minus number of 
seats already sold) is C. One probability of interest to the customer is the probability that supersavers 
will once again be available at the beginning of period k+1. The number of saver fares that will be 
requested during period k is given by the random variable Sk. However, this does not necessarily 
represent the number of saver fares that will be sold. No more than C-fk saver fares may be sold since C 
is the remaining plane capacity and fk seats are reserved for full fares. No saver fares may be sold if the 
current capacity of the plane is less than the reserve level, fk, for full fares. Thus, the number of saver 
fares that will be sold during period k is given by 
 
where the notation a+ is defined as follows: 
 
Thus, the capacity of the plane at the end of period k is provided by the random variable 
 
Fares in the supersaver class will only open up at the beginning of period k+1 if this capacity 
exceeds the protection level, sk+1, for the saver and full fare classes combined for period k+1. So, if a 
customer finds that the supersaver class is closed at the beginning of period k and the current capacity 
of the plane is C, then the probability a supersaver fare will be available at the beginning of period k+1 is 
simply  
 
This probability is straightforward to calculate since the distributions of Fk and Sk are known. 
If supersavers do not reopen for sale in period k+1, the possibility exists that they may still 
reopen sometime in the future. Under the assumption that supersavers do not reopen, the capacity of 
the plane at the end of period k+1 (ie the beginning of period k+2) is as follows: 
 
In general, for i>k, the capacity at the end of period i is given by the recursive expression 
 
Thus, the probability that a supersaver will open at some stage in the future is 
 
The first probability in the above expression is the probability that a supersaver opens up at the 
beginning of period k+1. The second probability is the probability a supersaver does not open at the 
beginning of period k+1 but opens at the beginning of period k+2. The third probability above is the 
probability that the supersaver is not available at the beginning of periods k+1 or k+2 but is available at 
the beginning of period k+3, etc. 
The above expressions are reasonably straightforward to calculate numerically. This is because 
the underlying random variables, Fi and Si, have known distributions. 
Pricing and Profit Implications of Strategic Buyers to Airlines 
We will investigate, via extensive simulations, the impact on revenues of strategic consumer 
behavior. In these simulations, we consider a 50-seat plane with three possible fares (full, saver and 
supersaver). Specifically, we investigate a ‘saver’ customer, that is, a customer who will purchase a saver 
fare unless a supersaver fare is currently available or the probability of a supersaver fare becoming 
available is sufficiently high, in which case a purchase decision will be postponed. 
Variables that can influence revenue include the demand factor, the number of fare reallocation 
periods and the price differential between fare classes. The demand factor is defined to be expected 
demand for seats on the flight divided by the aircraft capacity. The number of fare reallocation periods is 
the number of times that the airline will recalculate protection levels. 
Assume that protection levels are set according to the EMSR model. For the simulations, the 
means and standard deviations of total demand for each fare class are as shown in Table 4. The table 
indicates that 35% of demand was from full fare consumers, with 30% from saver fares and 35% from 
supersavers. The demand was split into three periods, with 30% occurring in the first period, 40% the 
second and the remaining 30%in the last period. While only for three fares, the demand data in Table 4 
can be representative of actual demand as there is a mix of lower fare and higher fare customers with 
lower fare requests tending to occur before higher fare requests. The quantity k is a scaling factor to 
enable us to vary the demand factor while keeping the coefficient of variation constant. For instance, 
k=1.1 gives a total expected demand of5 5, 10% more than the plane’s capacity. Table 5 contains the 
means and standard deviations for the three period case. 
The impact of decision frequency was investigated by increasing the number of periods (from 3 
to 6 and 12) by splitting demand in periods in half (from 3 to 6) or in quarters (from 3 to 12). Each of the 
newly created periods is iid, with the same total mean and variance as the parent period they were split 
from. For example, if the three period scenario with demand factor one of Table 4, was split into six 
periods, each of the three periods (for each fare class) would be split into two periods with those 
periods having a mean and variance equal to a half that of the original scenario (maintaining total mean 
demand and variance across different period scenarios). 
In Figure 2, results are presented for the cases where 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50% of saver customers 
will defer purchasing if no supersavers are currently available but there is at least a 70% chance of a 
supersaver becoming available before the flight departs. Simulations were run for demand factors that 
vary between 0.75 and 1.35. A demand factor of 0.75 represents a flight with low demand, where 
perhaps a strategy of not rejecting any requests would be reasonable, with 1.35 representing a flight 
with stronger demand—where more restrictive control of low-priced fares would be advantageous. The 
bottom curve in Figure 2 represents the revenue losses as a function of the demand factor if 50% of 
customers are willing to delay purchasing a ticket when the probability of a supersaver opening up 
before departure is at least 70%. Curves above represent the revenue losses if 40, 30, 20 and 10% of 
customers are willing to postpone purchasing. As can be seen in Figure 2, the revenue loss to the airline 
is more severe when the demand factor is low. For a demand factor of 0. 75 and only 10% of customers 
being willing to divert, there is more than a 1% revenue loss. If 50% are willing to divert, then revenue 
loss reaches almost 6%. From the airline industry’s point of view, even a percentage point loss has 
significant impact on profitability. For a demand factor of around 1.15, a revenue loss of more than 1% is 
sustained if more than 30% of customers are willing to defer when there is at least a 70% chance of a 
supersaver fare becoming available. So, even in the high demand factor situation, an airline could lose a 




 In Figure 3, results are provided for flights where the demand factor is set at 0.85. The first block 
of curves (illustrated with dots) contains results for the case where the airline has 12 reallocation 
periods. The next set of curves (illustrated by full lines) illustrates the impact on revenues if the airline 
has six reallocation periods, while the bottom block of curves (illustrated by dashes) shows the case of 
three allocation periods. Each block of curves contains results for four cases: those where the customer 
might defer purchase if the probability of a supersaver opening up is 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7. The bottom 
curve in Figure 3, for instance, represents the percentage revenue loss as a function of the fraction 
willing to postpone purchasing a ticket when the probability of a supersaver opening up in the future is 
at least 40%. As might be expected, Figure 3 illustrates the fact that the more allocation periods the 
airline has, the more it can adapt to customer behavior and minimize the potential revenue losses. 
The price differential between the various fare classes will naturally have an impact on revenue. 
Results are presented for a high-demand flight (Figure 4) and a low-demand flight (Figure 5). Here we 
assume that there are six fare reallocation periods and that customers will consider deferring purchase 
if there is at least a 70% probability that supersaver fare will reopen. The curves in Figures 4 and 5 
represent the cases where a supersaver fare is 25% (the dashed curve), 50% (the solid line) and 75% (the 
dotted curve) of the saver fare. Both figures indicate interesting results from a pricing standpoint. In 
Figure 4, the revenue losses from diverting customers can be less with more drastically reduced discount 
fares—revenue losses when the supersaver fare is 25% of the saver fare are lower than when it is 50%, 
until over half of customers are willing to wait for the supersaver class to reopen. This can occur since 
revenue losses are influenced by both the disparity between fares and the probability that a fare will 
reopen. If this latter is too low, a customer might take the higher fare even if the discounted fare is 
much lower. In Figure 5, these implications are not as dramatic given the low demand. Under low 
demand, the probability of reopening is higher (protection levels for full and saver are lower) and 
diversion occurs more frequently—resulting in similar revenue losses for fare ratios supersaver/saver 
of0. 25 and 0.5. 
 
 Conclusions 
In this paper we have looked at the most important airline yield management pricing system—
EMSR. We have demonstrated that it is possible for a consumer or a third party (such as a travel agent 
or an Internet travel site) to compute the probability that a currently closed fare class will open up at 
some time in the future. So now the consumer, when confronted with a situation where all of the 
cheapest fares are gone, may decide to wait before buying a ticket in the hope that a cheaper fare class 
will reopen. The implications of this strategic behavior on the part of the consumer can have serious 
revenue implications for the airline. This is particularly true in the case of low demand flights or flights 
with drastically discounted seats. When the airline sets prices, it should make allowance for strategic 
behavior on the part of the consumer. 
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